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JAPANESE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND 
SANCTIONS REVISITED: SUMITOMO v. UFJ  
VERONICA L. TAYLOR∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
As Japan’s “bubble economy” collapsed in 1989, Japanese government 
and industry turned to deregulatory policies as a way of restructuring the 
economy. As part of that process, formal law, legal institutions, and 
lawyers were all elevated as regulatory techniques. Rule-based, 
hierarchical controls became more visible.1 At the same time, informal 
regulation through changing social norms, industry practices, and self-
regulation tools such as codes of conduct and ethics emerged in new 
forms. I call this process the “re-regulation” of Japan.2  
My approach to understanding the last two decades of regulatory 
reform in Japan owes much to John Haley’s theories of the Japanese legal 
system.3 Haley argues that, despite its highly developed legal system, the 
Japanese state has relied heavily on informal social ordering and norm 
enforcement in order to achieve its policy goals.4 Moreover, he argues, this 
mix of formal and informal legal sanctions is the result of strong historical 
continuity in the evolution of social, economic, and legal institutions in 
 
 
 ∗ Dan Fenno Henderson Professor of Law and Director, Asian Law Center, University of 
Washington, Seattle (vtaylor@u.washington.edu). A different version of this Essay will appear in 
PUSHING AGAINST GLOBALIZATION (John Gillespie & Randall Peerenboom eds., Routledge) 
(forthcoming). 
 1.  For an analysis of how Japanese governance changed in response to global geo-political and 
economic shifts, see NAOKI TANAKA, NIHON NO ATARASHII RŪRU [JAPAN’S NEW RULES] (2004). 
 2. Veronica L. Taylor, Re-regulating Japanese Transactions: the Competition Law Dimension, 
in JAPANESE GOVERNANCE: BEYOND JAPAN INC. (Peter Drysdale & Jennifer Amyx eds., 2003). 
 3. JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991). 
A related paradigm that has been highly influential and remains salient is Frank Upham’s focus on 
litigation as an avenue of social protest. See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). See also Eric Feldman’s application of Upham’s approach to the 
contemporary area of health policy. ERIC FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY 
AND HEALTH POLICY (2000). The third dominant paradigm from the same generation of Japanese law 
scholars is, of course, Mark Ramseyer’s application of Chicago School economics to Japan. For his 
full bibliography, see http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/(follow “Ramseyer; J.Mark” 
hyperlink; then follow “View Bibliography” hyperlink; then follow “full bibliography”) (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2009). All three scholars employ different normative stances and very different 
methodologies, with Ramseyer’s preference for statistical data and regression analysis fitting neatly 
with trends in U.S. political science that emphasize “big N” style research. This Essay is not an 
intellectual history of the field, and so I limit my analysis to themes from Haley’s thesis. 
 4. HALEY, supra note 3. 
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Japan. In his depiction of mutually interdependent formal and informal 
modes of ordering within Japan, Haley seems to anticipate the pluralism 
that is the focus of much contemporary regulatory theory.5 However, he 
articulated this paradigm in Authority Without Power6 at precisely the time 
when Japan’s high growth economy began to slump and many modes of 
regulation thought to be distinctively Japanese started to unwind. What has 
followed is a series of debates across different disciplines about whether, 
and to what extent, Japanese regulation since the 1990s represents a 
paradigm shift, and, if so, towards what. Within the field of law, Haley 
argues that the twenty-first-century legal and regulatory mechanisms of 
governance in Japan represent, on balance, continuity, rather than a 
dramatic rupture between the present and past.7  
In this essay I examine Haley’s claim that we see more regulatory 
continuity than change in Japan, testing it against a case study of the failed 
banking merger between Sumitomo and UFJ financial groups (as they 
were then known) in 2004. The breakdown of this transaction made 
international headlines when Sumitomo sought a court injunction against 
UFJ and, when that failed, sued UFJ for breaching its agreement to 
negotiate.8 On appeal from that lawsuit in 2006, the parties settled, with 
Sumitomo receiving ¥2.5 billion (USD 21 million) in damages.9 On one 
hand, the failed merger illustrates the salience of Haley’s paradigm of 
Japanese law. Two major Japanese banking groups wind up in atypical 
litigation, and, as the attempted merger unravels, we see them choosing 
from both the “informal” and the “formal” sides of Haley’s model of 
strategies and sanctions. The courts, in turn, invoke familiar legal and 
social norms as they frame the dispute. Consistent with Haley’s thesis, we 
also see a “private” commercial transaction overlaid with a “public” 
concern about the future shape of a key Japanese industry and debates 
about the appropriate form and pace of deregulation. On the other hand, 
the transaction underscores the limitations of Haley’s model when applied 
 
 
 5. Id. For a survey of regulatory theory, see Christine Parker & John Braithwaite, Regulation, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 119 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002) (surveying 
regulatory theory); BRONWEN MORGAN AND KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
REGULATION: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2007). 
 6. HALEY, supra note 3.  
 7. John O. Haley & Veronica L. Taylor, Rule of Law in Japan, in DISCOURSES ON RULE OF 
LAW IN ASIA 446, 467 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004). 
 8. Martin Fackler & Henny Sender, Court Limits Japan Bank Merger Talks, WALL ST. J., July 
28, 2004, at C5. 
 9. Press Release, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Settlement Agreed with the Sumitomo Trust 
& Banking Co., Ltd. (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.mufg.jp/data/current/pressrelease-
20061121-001-e.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/15
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to a globalized and now re-regulating Japan. The parties to this dispute 
operate in a financial market that is subject to both global and domestic 
regulation at multiple levels. New elements emerge from the transaction, 
including a host of new regulatory actors, such as foreign investors and 
lawyer intermediaries. These new elements, in turn, prompt the parties to 
turn to the courts as arbiters of the dispute—a move that is both deliberate 
and likely to endure. Together these elements suggest that Haley’s “law 
without sanctions” needs to be re-thought in twenty-first-century Japan.  
HALEY’S JAPAN AND LEGAL AND REGULATORY REFORM SINCE 1989 
Haley’s Japan is a complex place, full of light and shade. His Japanese 
state is characterized by “authority without power,” possessing a highly 
developed system of legal rules, standards and mechanisms for formal 
adjudication but choosing to harness social norms and rely heavily on 
informal social ordering and norm enforcement in order to achieve its 
policy goals: 
Legislators, bureaucrats and judges may continue to articulate and 
apply, and thus legitimate, new rules and standards of conduct. The 
norms thus created and legitimized may have significant impact. To 
the extent that legal sanctions are weak, however, their validity 
depends upon consensus, and thus as “living” law, they become 
nearly indistinguishable from nonlegal or customary norms.10 
The weakness of legal sanctions is thus a feature of the system and the 
corollary to the “myth of the reluctant litigant,” which holds that relatively 
low levels of litigation can be explained by the state’s rationing of formal 
legal adjudication and sanctions through institutional design.11 A highly 
credentialed and independent Japanese judiciary, procuracy, and bar are 
deliberately constrained by the state so that both their capacity to deliver 
formal sanctions and their accessibility to citizens is limited. This, in turn, 
feeds the social stigma associated with using litigation as a dispute 
resolution mechanism. Haley argues that this controlled mix of formal 
legal sanctions and informal social ordering represents a strong historical 
continuity in the evolution of social and legal institutions in Japan. While 
stressing these historical antecedents, Haley also acknowledges that 
culture is fluid and that the norms underpinning these policy decisions and 
institutional design choices are subject to change.  
 
 
 10. HALEY, supra note 3, at 169.  
 11. See John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978). 
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In the commercial sphere, the paradigm involves a kind of legal 
dualism: Japanese domestic transactions need a relatively small number of 
legal professionals, if any, and rely on minimalist design in contract 
transactions and avoidance of commercial litigation and arbitration. 
“International” transactions, by contrast, are export-oriented and have 
controllable international inputs of standards, services, and capital. Haley 
represents the duality thus: 
The demand for ways to reduce the risk and costs intrinsic to a 
volatile social and economic environment is also manifest in the 
prevalence of dependency and relational contracting. The oft-
repeated Japanese penchant for informal, long-term contractual 
relationships, in which “goodwill” and personal trust are more 
important than written contracts, is symptomatic of transactional 
relationships in which the parties rely more on morals and markets 
than laws for enforcement. . . . On the other hand, when contracting 
abroad within legal systems Japanese believe are likely to enforce 
their agreements, they negotiate and draft with extreme care. 
Similarly a Japanese firm will assiduously abide by adverse 
commitments to its contract partners in cases where sanctions—
either informal, arising out of either their relative bargaining 
positions or the promise of an ongoing relationship, or formal, such 
as the likelihood of legal action—are perceived to be strong.12 
This observation raises the question whether, as Japan’s high growth 
economy began to slump after 1989 and policy-makers began to rethink 
regulation, these dualist transactional preferences and practices changed. 
The Sumitomo v. UFJ dispute described below suggests that they have. 
The 1990s were called the “lost decade” by many Japanese and foreign 
scholars because of the perceived failure by the governing triumvirate of 
the Liberal Democratic Party, career bureaucrats, and big business to 
deregulate a stalled economy.13 By 2008 many commentators agreed that 
the Japanese government and industry had significantly restructured key 
political, economic and social institutions since 1989,14 but they continue 
 
 
 12. HALEY, supra note 3, at 181. 
 13. See, e.g., EDWARD J. LINCOLN, ARTHRITIC JAPAN: THE SLOW PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
(2001); Luke Nottage & Leon Wolff, Corporate Governance and Law Reform in Japan: From the 
Lost Decade to the End of History? (Comparative Research Law & Political Econ., Research Paper 
No. 3/2005, 2005). Others argued that the deregulatory push in Japan, albeit fitful between the 
Nakasone (1982–1987) and Koizumi cabinets (2001–2006), induced important and enduring 
institutional changes. See also JAPANESE GOVERNANCE: BEYOND JAPAN INC., supra note 2.  
 14. See, e.g., Gregory Noble, Koizumi and Neo-liberal Economic Reform, SOC. SCI. JAPAN 34 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/15
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to disagree about the pace and effect of regulatory reform and whether 
Japan has been “remodeled,”15 “reprogrammed,”16 or has adopted 
“aggressive legalism”17 in spheres such as industrial policy, technology, 
and trade.  
My own hypothesis is that Japan has shifted from being a 
“developmental state” to being a “new regulatory state”18 and the 
interesting question is how the contours of the new regulatory 
arrangements are being laid in different areas of the economy. For the 
purposes of this Essay, I limit this argument to the Sumitomo v. UFJ case 
study and four regulatory shifts that it seems to illustrate: (i) diffusion of 
state regulatory functions to private actors or quasi-state actors; (ii) new 
modes of corporate self-regulation; (iii) the impact of globalization on 
factors (i) and (ii); and (iv) a turn to formal law, or juridification. Below I 
outline the facts and the legal strategies used in Sumitomo v. UFJ and then 
consider how this dispute may illustrate these regulatory shifts. 
THE PROPOSED SUMITOMO-UFJ MERGER  
The transaction began as a consensual merger negotiation between two 
major financial institutions in Japan in the wake of its banking crisis of 
1997-1998.19 This crisis had prompted the government to re-regulate the 
industry by stripping banking supervision from the Ministry of Finance in 
1998 and creating an independent regulator, the Financial Supervision 
Agency (“FSA,” later known as the Financial Services Agency).20 The 
FSA was charged with applying stringent global standards, including new 
accounting rules to implement the Basel capital adequacy requirements for 
banks.21 A wave of industry restructuring followed: between 2000 and 
 
 
(Newsl. of Inst. Soc. Sci., Univ. of Tokyo), Mar. 2006, at 6–9; see also STEVEN K. VOGEL, JAPAN 
REMODELED (2006). 
 15. VOGEL, supra note 14. 
 16. MARIE ANCHORDOGUY, REPROGRAMMING JAPAN (2005). 
 17. Saadia M. Pekkanen, Aggressive Legalism: The Rules of the WTO and Japan’s Emerging 
Trade Strategy, 24 WORLD ECON. 707 (2001); SAADIA M. PEKKANEN, JAPAN’S AGGRESSIVE 
LEGALISM: LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE POLITICS BEYOND THE WTO (2008). 
 18. Parker & Braithwaite, supra note 5, at 119.  
 19. Three large financial institutions failed in 1997, including city bank Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank. Hiroshi Ōta, Economic Forum: Learning the Painful Lessons of the Financial Crisis, DAILY 
YOMIURI, Nov. 24, 1999, at 7. These failures were followed by the 1998 collapse of the Long-Term 
Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank. Takahisa Ishii, Megabanks in the Making: Sense of 
Banking Crisis Precipitated Alliances, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 16, 1999, at 1. 
 20. Kaoru Hosono, Koji Sakai & Kotaro Tsuru, Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Cause and 
Consequences 11–12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13399, 2007), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13399.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
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2002 seven mergers had occurred among major banks.22 In 2004, at the tail 
end of this process, Sumitomo and UFJ were looking for merger partners, 
and the stakes were high. Within a domestic banking industry that had 
chalked up ten consecutive years of losses, UFJ was one of two city banks 
at the time that was severely undercapitalized (and possibly substantively 
insolvent).23 Analysts predicted that the Japanese market could only 
support a finite number of truly global banks.  
On May 21, 2004, Sumitomo announced its intention to purchase 
UFJ’s trust banking unit, one of UFJ’s only profitable operations.24 The 
value of the transaction was ¥300 billion (USD 2.76 billion).25 A letter of 
intent between Sumitomo Trust and Banking Company26 (“Sumitomo”) 
and the UFJ Holdings Group (“UFJ”) regarding the UFJ Trust Bank was 
formally drafted and reviewed by the parties’ attorneys. Article 8 of the 
agreement provided that each party was to negotiate in good faith to 
conclude a basic agreement on the detailed terms of the business 
integration by the end of July 2004 and conclude a final agreement on 
integration as soon as practicable.27 Article 12 of the agreement further (a) 
obliged the parties to negotiate in good faith on matters stipulated in the 
letter of intent and any matters arising from but not stipulated in the 
agreement and (b) prohibited the parties from either directly or indirectly 
providing information to, or negotiating with, third parties in relation to 
any matters that were the subject of the agreement.28  
Significantly, the agreement contained no penalties for non-
performance.29 “‘We suggested a breakup fee to Sumitomo Trust’ says one 
 
 
 22. Id. at 12. 
 23. Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Solutions to Japan’s Banking Problems: What Might Work 
and What Definitely Will Fail 25 (Aug. 27, 2004) (draft prepared for the US-Japan Conference on the 
Solutions for the Japanese Economy), available at http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/%7Eiwaisako/solutions/ 
Hoshi-Kashyap_final.pdf. 
 24. UFS to Sell Trust Bank Unit, DAILY YOMIURI, May 21, 2004, at 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Sumitomo Trust and Banking Company was, and remains, a separate entity from Sumitomo 
Mitsui Financial Group, although both are part of the Sumitomo corporate group. See http://www. 
sumitomotrust.co.jp/IR/company/en/about_html/group.html; http://www.smfg.co.jp/english/aboutus/ 
profile/. 
 27. Compare Fackler & Sender, supra note 8 (reporting that the banks agreed to a two-year 
negotiation period), with Sumitomo Trust & Banking Corp. v. UFS Holdings Corp., 1928 HANREI JIHŌ 
3 (Tokyo D. Ct., Feb. 13, 2006) (stating that the agreed upon term was one year and ten months). 
 28. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Corp. v. UFS Holdings Corp., 1708 SHŌJI HŌMU 22, 24 (Sup. 
Ct., Aug. 30, 2004). The undertakings to negotiate in good faith were, of course, applications of the 
Japanese Civil Code, which states that “[t]he exercise of rights and performance of duties shall be done 
in faith and in accordance with the principles of trust,” and which applies to all legal acts in Japan, 
whether explicitly incorporated in the terms of the agreement or not. MINPŌ, art. 1, para. 2, translated 
in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SERIES, No. 2100–01 (2005). 
 29. See the summary of the transaction documentation in Mitsuru Claire Chino, Noboru 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/15
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lawyer who worked on the deal. ‘But they rejected it, saying the business 
must be based on trust.’”30 
On July 13, 2004, UFJ unilaterally broke off merger talks with 
Sumitomo and on July 14 it entered into full merger talks with the 
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group (“MTFG”).31 Ultimately, MTFG 
acquired the UFJ Group, including the UFJ Trust Bank, creating the 
world’s largest bank with USD 1.75 trillion in assets.32 That merger took 
place in 2005, creating the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (“MUFG”), of 
which the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Mitsubishi-UFJ Trust and 
Banking, and Mitsubishi-UFJ Securities are subsidiary units.33 
Sumitomo responded to this breakdown in negotiation by calling the 
press. As a result, UFJ’s termination of the letter of intent was widely 
reported: “‘They just told us all of a sudden,’ Sumitomo Trust spokesman 
Naoki Sugihara said. ‘We were shocked that they would cancel something 
so critical without at least consulting us first.’”34  
On the same day, July 14, 2004, UFJ and MTFG shares were 
suspended on the basis of the possible merger and Sumitomo’s share price 
subsequently fell by about fourteen percent.35 Two days later, on July 16, 
2004, UFJ and MTFG announced talks aimed at effecting a merger. 
Sumitomo issued a formal objection and immediately sought an interim 
injunction from the Tokyo District Court restraining UFJ from both 
providing information to, and negotiating with, third parties.36  
SUMITOMO’S MULTI-TRACK APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATION 
BREAKDOWN 
Sumitomo responded to UFJ’s termination of the negotiation by 
pursuing a multi-track strategy. First, it sought injunctive relief to prevent 
UFJ from proceeding with merger talks with MTFG, a move that was 
 
 
Kashiwagi & Ayako Okada, Contract and Tort, in JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW 173, 179 (Gerald 
McAlinn ed., 2007). 
 30. Fackler & Sender, supra note 8. 
 31. Confusingly, after the initial merger that created this bank, it was known in Japanese as 
Mitsubishi-Tokyo Bank (and is reported as such in the English language press coverage of this failed 
merger), but it is officially known in English as the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. 
 32. Fackler & Sender, supra note 8.  
 33. See Mitsubishi UFJ Fin. Group, About MUFG, http://www.mufg.jp/english/profile/group 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
 34. Fackler & Sender, supra note 8. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Kan Tsutagawa, Economic Forum: UFS Battle Banks from Past, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 4. 
2004, at 4. 
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successful in the short term but overturned on appeal.37 Second, it sought 
to convince UFJ’s shareholders, through media announcements, that the 
Sumitomo merger, including a one-for-one share exchange, represented 
better value for UFJ than the proposed rival merger.38 This effort was 
significant because any merger of a business of this size would require a 
special resolution (two-thirds approval) by shareholders at a general 
meeting.39 At the time about one-third of UFJ’s shares were reportedly 
owned by foreign investors.40  
In support of its claim that it represented a better tie-up partner, 
Sumitomo launched a counter-offer to the MTFG proposal on August 9, 
2004, announcing that it was ready to offer a ¥500 billion (USD 4.48 
billion) tranche of fresh capital to help write off UFJ’s bad loans, in 
addition to reserving management positions for UFJ executives in the new 
merged entity.41 Then, on October 7, 2004, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial 
Group announced that it had purchased three hundred shares in UFJ 
Holdings, “raising the prospect of a proxy fight at the weaker rival’s 
annual meeting.”42 Part of this strategy was aimed at influencing press 
opinion and encouraging foreign shareholder and outside director pressure 
on UFJ to consider Sumitomo’s counteroffer and recommence 
negotiations. This maneuvering reportedly resulted in a letter writing 
campaign from shareholders to UFJ management, asking it to consider 
alternative proposals to the Mitsubishi Tokyo deal.43  
At this point UFJ was under intense financial pressure. Having posted 
losses for three years in a row, it was carrying significant debt from bad 
loans, which were publicly declared to be 10.24% of its loan portfolio in 
August 2004.44 Press reports speculated that UFJ would be subject to 
government pressure to resolve these problems quickly and seek a large 
capital infusion to prevent its capital levels from dwindling to dangerous 
lows.45 
 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. David Ibisan, Final Ratio Will Determine Victor in Battle for the Banks, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2005, at 16. 
 39. SHŌHŌ, art. 343, translated in EHS L. BULL. SERIES, No. 2200–01 (2005). 
 40. Andrew Morse, Sumitomo Mitsui Raises Heat on UFJ, WALL ST. J. (ASIA), Oct. 8, 2004, at 
A1. 
 41. Andrew Morse & Martin Fackler, Japan Bank Fight Grows More Public, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
9, 2004, at A3. 
 42. Morse, supra note 40. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Morse & Fackler, supra note 41. 
 45. In October 2004 it also became the target of a criminal complaint against UFJ’s banking unit 
and former executives for allegedly obstructing an investigation by hiding and destroying documents, 
resulting in the suspension of some of its banking operations by regulators. Morse, supra note 40. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/15
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When UFJ announced its plans to go with MTFG, Sumitomo turned to 
a third strategy—consideration of a hostile takeover of UFJ. This then 
prompted a ¥700 billion (USD 6.28 billion) capital injection into UFJ’s 
commercial bank by MTFG, with UFJ issuing a new class of preferred 
shares of MTFG in return on September 10, 2004, giving MTFG veto 
power over UFJ’s major business decisions—in effect a poison pill 
defense.46 The fourth and final strategy was to commence Sumitomo’s 
litigation for damages for losses suffered during the breakdown of the 
negotiation and its protracted attempt to restart it.47  
THE COURT INJUNCTION TRACK 
While the business strategies of the two parties played out, Sumitomo 
had initiated a parallel legal track, seeking formal injunctive relief from 
the courts in order to force UFJ back to the negotiating table.48  
On July 27, 2004, the Tokyo District Court granted the injunctive relief 
sought by Sumitomo.49 That decision was based on the idea that the parties 
had evidenced their agreement in writing, and therefore, in the absence of 
other compelling reasons, this agreement should be treated as binding.50 
Moreover, the draft of the letter of intent including the lock-in clause had 
been prepared by Sumitomo, reviewed by the lawyer for UFJ, modified by 
agreement of those responsible on behalf of the parties, and then signed 
and sealed by the parties’ representative directors.51 It should, therefore, be 
treated as legally binding. Clearly, negotiations between UFJ and a third 
party would cause serious damage and immediate danger to the applicant 
and to avoid this, injunctive relief was necessary.52 
 
 
 46. Id.; Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2178 n.21 (2005) (citing Scramble for UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui Seen at Dead 
End, NIKKEI BUS., Sept 20, 2004, available at http://nikkeibp.jp/wes/leaf/CID/onair/nbc/features/ 
332662). In substance this was a poison pill defense, but it was applied ahead of those adopted by 
other Japanese takeover targets and in advance of formal court consideration and ratification of the 
poison pill defenses in Japanese corporations law. For an extended discussion of these later 
developments, see id.; Cristina Alger, Note, The Livedoor Looking Glass: Examining the Limits of 
Hostile Takeover Bids in Japan, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 309 (2006).  
 47. Milhaupt, supra note 46, at 2178. 
 48. Fackler & Sender, supra note 8. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Milhaupt, supra note 46, at 2178. 
 51. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Corp. v. UFS Holdings Corp., 1708 SHŌJI HŌMU 22, 24 (Sup. 
Ct., Aug. 30, 2004). 
 52. MINJI HOZEN HŌ [JAPENESE CIVIL PRESERVATION CODE], Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 23, para. 
2. 
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In response to UFJ’s formal objection to the injunction, the Tokyo 
District Court confirmed its original injunction and issued an injunction 
for preservation on August 4, 2004.53 UFJ appealed the original injunction 
to the Tokyo High Court, which set the injunction aside on August 11, 
2004. Within hours, the boards of directors of MTFG and UFJ approved a 
merger of the two groups.54 
In setting aside the injunction, the Tokyo High Court confirmed that 
article 12 of the letter of intent was legally valid and could be the basis for 
a restraining injunction.55 Moreover, the declaration by UFJ dated July 14, 
2004, stating that it was terminating the agreement had no legal basis.56 
However, the court found that: 
In relation to the said agreement, the major precondition was a 
mutual trust relationship supported by good faith efforts to bring 
about a cooperative enterprise. When the applicants decided to 
overcome their difficult situation by setting aside the agreement 
[literally returning the agreement to a blank piece paper] and 
announced this publicly and when the respondent reacted by 
seeking the injunction and in that initial hearing and in this hearing 
both arguments have been in opposition, the trust relationship has 
significantly eroded and we are in a situation where it is difficult to 
bridge the parties’ [differences]. As of today, viewed objectively, 
the trust relationship between the parties has already broken down; 
moreover, we have to assume that it is already impossible for the 
parties to negotiate in good faith to reach a final agreement. 
Consequently, at the very latest, we would view the final day of the 
examination, 10 August 2004, as being the point at which the article 
in question substantively has lost its prospective binding effect and 
at this point there is no leeway to allow a restraining injunction.57 
On further appeal by Sumitomo, the Supreme Court, on August 30, 
2004, affirmed the High Court decision to set aside the injunction.58 First, 
the Supreme Court concurred with the High Court that the letter of intent 
was legally valid, that it could be the basis for an injunction, and that 
 
 
 53. See generally id. 
 54. Milhaupt, supra note 46, at 2178. Presumably this was a directors’ resolution subject to 
confirmation at a later shareholders’ meeting. 
 55. Sumitomo, 1708 SHŌJI HŌMU at 23. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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subsequent events did not cause it to lose its legally binding power.59 The 
Court then noted that by this time, UFJ had announced a merger with 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi and a plan to complete that transaction by October 1, 
2005.60 
Next, on the question of whether the lock-in clause had lost its legal 
effect, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the clause was to make 
good faith negotiation possible and that it was therefore intimately linked 
to the negotiation itself.61 As a result, once the possibility of a final 
agreement no longer existed, the obligation underlying the lock-in clause 
was extinguished.62 Reviewing the chronology of events to that point, the 
Court judged the likelihood of reaching a final agreement to be “low.”63 
Nevertheless, the Court then continued: 
However, in light of the overall chronology in this case, it is not 
possible to say that all fluid factors have completely disappeared 
and so, from a social sense [shakaitsūnen, literally the conventional 
wisdom of society] we cannot say that the possibility referred to 
above does not exist. Thus the obligation underlying the article in 
question must be treated as not having been extinguished.64 
Thus the Court upheld the obligation to negotiate.  
The Court then turned to the question of whether a sufficient dispute 
existed between the parties to justify injunctive relief in order to avoid 
serious damage or immediate danger to one of the parties. On this point, 
the Court held that the letter of intent did not compel the conclusion of a 
final agreement, but instead only made possible the conditions for the 
negotiations that might have that result.65 Therefore, Sumitomo had simply 
a hope of reaching a binding agreement. Consequently, any damage 
suffered by Sumitomo should not be assessed as resulting from the loss of 
profits or benefits that would have accrued from a final agreement.66 In 
light of the low likelihood of a final agreement being reached and the 
passage of time up until that point, the Court then found no serious 
 
 
 59. Id. at 25. 
 60. Id. at 24. 
 61. Id. at 25. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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damage or immediate danger sufficient to justify granting a restraining 
injunction.67 
Against this background, UFJ and Mitsubishi finally concluded their 
contract of merger on February 18, 2005, merging to become MUFG on 
October 1, 2005.68 
THE LITIGATED DAMAGES CLAIM 
Once it became clear that the transaction was dead and that the 
injunctive track was exhausted, Sumitomo launched a suit for tort damages 
in the amount of ¥100 billion for breach of the duty of good faith created 
by the letter of intent on March 7, 2005, and for the failure to conclude a 
final agreement.69 The case raised five issues:  
 (a) Was there an obligation under the letter of intent to conclude 
a final agreement? 
 (b) Could article 130 of the Civil Code be applied directly or 
analogously as the basis for an estoppel that required the UFJ group 
to conclude a final agreement? 
 (c) Did UFJ have an obligation to negotiate in good faith and 
exclusively with Sumitomo? 
 (d) Did UFJ’s obligation to negotiate in good faith and 
exclusively with Sumitomo expire on July 13, 2004, had it breached 
these obligations, and was there a non-performance of an obligation 
or a tort? 
 (e) If there was non-performance of an obligation or a tort, what 
was the amount of foreseeable damages?70 
 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Press Release, Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group et al., MTFG and UFJ Group Enter into an 
Integration Agreement, Which Sets Forth the Merger Ratios and Official Corporate Names of the New 
Group (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.mufg.jp/english/pressrelease/2005-mtfg/pdffile/ 
050218e_06.pdf; Press Release, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Establishment of Mitsubishi UFJ 
Financial Group (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.mufg.jp/data/current/pressrelease-20051003-
001-e.pdf. 
 69. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Corp. v. UFS Holdings Corp., 1928 HANREI JIHŌ 3 (Tokyo Dist. 
Ct., Feb. 3, 2006). 
 70. Id. at 6. 
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The Tokyo District Court responded to those questions as follows: 
 (a) The letter of intent was concluded at a relatively early state in 
the parties’ negotiations, on the basis of limited information 
exchanged. It included no provision that clearly required a final 
agreement to be reached, and so the parties could not be treated as 
having assumed an obligation to conclude a final agreement. 
Moreover, this was something that could only be done as the result 
of a decision reached after further negotiation and due diligence.71 
 (b) Since the content of a final contract was not determined and 
no final contract was validly created, the necessary prerequisite for 
the direct application or application by analogy to article 130 of the 
Civil Code was lacking.72 
 (c) The UFJ group was under an obligation to negotiate 
exclusively with Sumitomo and to negotiate in good faith.73 
 (d) Since the letter of intent was a process for forming a final 
agreement, when the possibility for creating a final contract through 
repeated negotiation between Sumitomo and the UFJ group no 
longer existed, their obligations would also be extinguished; 
however, in the case where the UFJ group had—without negotiation 
or consultation—announced that it would set aside the letter of 
intent, it could not be said that no possibility of forming a final 
contract existed.74 Thus the obligation to negotiate exclusively and 
the obligation to negotiate in good faith could not be said to expire; 
moreover when UFJ group unilaterally took merger discussions to 
the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group (MTFG), in doing so they 
assumed the burden of breaching these [obligations or committing a 
tort];75 
 (e) To the extent that a final contract did not exist, a foreseeable 
relationship between the breach of the obligations to negotiate 
exclusively and to negotiate in good faith and the profit that would 
have arisen under a final contract, could not be established, and 
since Sumitomo was unable to show or prove damages arising from 
 
 
 71. Id. at 15. The decision uses the legal neologism dyū dirijiensu. 
 72. Id. at 19. 
 73. Id. at 19–20. 
 74. Id. at 20–22. The court also noted the relatively long period provided for the negotiation—the 
letter of intent was valid for a year and eight months. Id. at 3. 
 75. Id. at 20–22. 
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the breach of obligation or the tort, the claim for damages was 
dismissed.76 
The Tokyo District Court dismissed Sumitomo’s damages claim on 
February 13, 2006.77 On appeal to the Tokyo High Court on February 24, 
2006, Sumitomo reduced its claim to ¥10 billion.78 On November 21, 
2006, Sumitomo and MTFG settled in the Tokyo High court for ¥2.5 
billion (USD 21 million), payable by MTFG.79 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LITIGATION 
The ultimate obligation to pay damages could not have been a surprise 
for UFJ and its takeover partner, MTFG. When Sumitomo succeeded in 
attaining the 2004 injunction at first instance, “officials at UFJ and 
Mitsubishi Tokyo said the most likely outcome would be for UFJ to try to 
strike some out-of-court deal with Sumitomo Trust, possibly involving 
payment of compensation.”80  
This prediction was consistent with Japanese contract law, and 
specifically with jurisprudence on the Civil Code’s article 1(2), which 
creates a duty of good faith that applies to all legal acts, regardless of 
whether the duty is directly referenced or documented by the parties.81 It is 
well-established that this duty applies to the pre-contractual negotiation 
period.82 Parties are at liberty to terminate a pre-contractual negotiation. 
However, if a party terminates unilaterally, in the absence of a serious 
reason that absolves it of fault, that party will be liable for damages. What 
distinguishes Sumitomo v. UFJ at first glance is that it makes clear that the 
breach of a duty to negotiate exclusively under a letter of intent (the lock-
in clause in this case) is a breach of an obligation or a tort.83 Many studies 
of Japanese courts suggest that the judge frequently takes an active role in 
 
 
 76. Id. at 24. 
 77. Id. at 4.  
 78. Press Release, Sumitomo Shintaku Ginko Corp., UFS Gurūpu (Gen Mitsubishi UFS Gurūpu) 
ni taisuru soshō ni kansuru kōso ni tsuite (Feb. 24, 2006), available at http://wwww.sumitamo. 
co.jp/IR/company/jp/pdf/nr2006/c60224.pdf. 
 79. Press Release, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, supra note 9. 
 80. Fackler & Sender, supra note 8. 
 81. MINPŌ, art. 1, para. 2. 
 82. On precontractual liability, see Takashi Uchida, Zadankai: Gendai keiyakuhpō no aratana 
tenkai to ippan jōkō [Roundtable: New Developments in Contemporary Contract Law and General 
Clauses] 515 NBL 12 (1993) and WILLEM M. VISSER’T HOOFT, JAPANESE CONTRACT AND ANTI-
TRUST LAW (2002). 
 83. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Corp. v. UFS Holdings Corp., 1928 HANREI JIHŌ 3, 4 (Tokyo 
Dist. Ct., Feb. 3, 2006). 
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encouraging settlement and in providing a clear indication of what the 
damages award is likely to be if the parties persist to judgment. Thus, 
although the appeal did not result in a damages award per se, it is likely to 
be read as a strong indicator of the court’s stance in the case. 
This transaction is atypical, since it is the first case in the postwar 
period in Japan (or perhaps ever) in which one Japanese financial 
institution sued another for breach of good faith in negotiation and the 
failure to consummate a consensual merger. Even in the deregulatory 
decade and a half since 1989, Japan has seen relatively little litigation 
around M&A activity and very few attempted hostile takeovers.84 As 
Christina Ahmadjian comments, there is still a strong sense of stigma 
about overtly aggressive pressure toward corporate targets in Japan, even 
among foreign investors: 
The propensity of foreigners to take a gentle approach to 
governance and not to rely on legal recourse or aggressive 
shareholder activism seems more a case of social norms than to [sic] 
institutional and legal barriers to action. Shareholder derivative suits 
were available for use, but though numbers of these suits had 
increased after a decrease in the filing fee in the early 1990s, foreign 
shareholders did not use them. . . . [F]oreign investors that I 
interviewed suggested that they were concerned about not appearing 
too aggressive and demanding . . . .  
 There was also, among foreign investors, especially the 
investment banks, a concern that over-aggressive behavior would be 
punished. . . . A fear of government reprisal was likely one of the 
reasons that foreign investors remained low-key in their activism.85  
Thus, at one level Sumitomo v. UFJ provides an interesting twist on the 
perennial theme of Japanese litigiousness or lack thereof, with Sumitomo 
pressing forward with litigation that may or may not have been the direct 
preference of its foreign shareholders.86 
Litigating commercial transactional breakdowns in a de-regulating 
Japan, however, is not at all unusual. Injunctions are used frequently as a 
 
 
 84. See Milhaupt, supra note 46; Alger, supra note 46.  
 85. Christina Ahmadjian, Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 125, 138 
(Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 2007). 
 86. See, e.g., Eric A. Feldman, Law, Culture and Conflict: Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, 
in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
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tool by commercial lawyers and their clients in Japan.87 From 1989 
onwards, Japanese case reports are full of contract termination litigation as 
the economy slid into a prolonged downturn.88 A parallel body of 
commercial litigation is also propelled by personal bankruptcy and 
corporate insolvencies, which reached historically high levels during the 
same period.89 Yet Sumitomo v. UFJ is not the average unilateral 
termination case in which a vulnerable injured party pleads breach of good 
faith as a safety net argument because its very economic existence is 
threatened. Here we have commercial banking groups operating in a 
global market, subject to a host of global and domestic regulatory 
standards and statutory controls, and accustomed to calculating 
transactional risk. The latter feature of the transaction is reflected in its 
formal documentation, also characteristic of the banking sector.  
What is interesting about the courts’ analyses in both the injunction and 
damages claims, however, is that they view the fundamental obligations of 
the parties in relational terms: parties are to negotiate in good faith and 
build a trust relationship that would be the basis for the business 
integration. Thus, although the transaction breakdown occurred at the 
beginning of a potential merger, rather than mid-way through a continuing 
contract, the court acknowledged the extended duration of the negotiation 
and the likelihood (however slight) of the relationship being resuscitated. 
As it weighs the nature of the relationship, the Supreme Court invokes 
social norms (shakaitsūnen, literally the conventional wisdom of society). 
Here we see considerable continuity in the Court’s preference for 
preserving commercial relationships (or encouraging the parties to do so) 
if at all possible.  
Doctrinally, the case is unremarkable because the background statute, 
the Civil Code, and related case decisions are relatively clear. This is not a 
situation in which new regulatory law is being tested.90 What contributes 
 
 
 87. Personal Communication with Japanese attorney Yoriko Noma, 2004. This pattern has not 
attracted much analysis by foreign scholars, presumably because either the dispute settles and the case 
is not important enough to warrant case reporting, or the injunction is a very minor part of the overall 
litigation strategy. 
 88. For an analysis of the cases and jurisprudence on franchising and continuing contract 
breakdowns during the 1990s, see WILLEM M. VISSER’T HOOFT, JAPANESE CONTRACT AND ANTI-
TRUST LAW (2002). 
 89. This accounts for much of what Tom Ginsburg sees as a surge in voluntary litigation during 
the same period. See Tom Ginsburg & Glenn P. Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical 
Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 36 (2006). I tend to view bankruptcy-
propelled civil litigation as somewhat involuntary. 
 90. In the wake of a series of attempted hostile takeovers of non-banking corporations that 
followed this case, and the spread of deliberate poison-pill defenses, the Fair Trade Commission did 
promulgate a Takeovers Code in 2004. Salil K. Mehra, Same Plant, Different Soil: Japan's New 
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interest from a practice perspective is that the district court’s treatment of 
the damages claim raises some uncertainty about how those damages 
should be calculated.91 The court seemed to treat the calculation of 
damages as limited to Sumitomo’s expectation interest in the to-be-
negotiated “basic agreement” regarding the merger, because this was the 
basis on which the claim was argued. Predictably, the court found neither 
an obligation to finalize that agreement nor a high probability that the 
agreement could be reached, particularly as the negotiations and the 
parties’ relationship began to unravel. A stronger basis for arguing the 
case would have been either the plaintiff’s reliance interest or the damage 
incurred as a result of entering into the negotiation and having it 
unilaterally terminated. Presumably such considerations played a role in 
the eventual settlement.  
This case is also unique because of the parties’ inability (or 
unwillingness) to settle at an early stage of the dispute. While Sumitomo 
clearly suffered economic loss from the UFJ termination of the proposed 
merger, it also seems as though the damages litigation was intended to 
have a symbolic as well as substantive effect. In the section below I 
analyze in greater detail the regulatory background against which the 
parties formulated their dispute strategies. 
THE DIFFUSION OF REGULATORY ACTORS AND GLOBALIZATION  
In Japan, as in other “new regulatory states” an expansion of the 
mechanisms of regulation allow the state to separate and delegate some of 
its traditional functions and services to private actors or quasi-state 
actors.92 State reliance on private actors, as Haley points out, is not a new 
phenomenon in Japan.93 What changes in the 1990s, however, is both the 
mode of harnessing private actors and the language used to describe this 
phenomenon. 
 
 
Merger Guidelines 26 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 515 (2006). Corporations law jurisprudence on the 
poison pill also developed rapidly. 
 91. The doctrinal aspects of this case are discussed by Doshisha University Law School scholar 
Koji Takahashi (unpublished paper, on file with author). 
 92. A key example in the field of regulatory studies is the regulatory pyramid employed in 
responsive regulation. IAN AYERS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 161 (1992). This construct encourages changes in state-initiated 
governance by building in a range of public and private stakeholders, providing mechanisms for each 
to monitor the other, and employing techniques such as enforced self-regulation. 
 93. HALEY, supra note 3 (describing the historical antecedents of the Japanese state’s co-option 
of individuals and social groups to advance state social ordering objectives). 
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Banks and public companies in Japan were at the forefront of a new 
wave of self-regulation in the 1990s. What Japanese corporations had 
previously termed “jisei,” or self-regulation, had been critiqued by foreign 
commentators as a technique for closing markets and dividing market 
share;94 the concept had now, however, been re-framed as a range of 
borrowed Anglo-American concepts and techniques of regulation. Thus 
“corporate governance” was operationalized through legislative reform to 
corporate vehicles and governance structures, the introduction of 
consolidated accounting, and the enhancement of the role of the statutory 
auditor. “Transparency” was bolstered by lowering court filing fees to 
permit shareholder actions against company directors and auditors.95 The 
“contract” came to be understood as a regulatory institution,96 and, as in 
Sumitomo v. UFJ, formalization of high-value contracts through the 
intermediation of attorneys became the norm. Banks and corporations 
were also subject to new legislative intervention by the state emphasizing 
consumer protection, efficiency, and formal dispute resolution.97 “Due 
diligence” procedures were adopted, as in Sumitomo v. UFJ, in a market in 
which M&A activity, both friendly and hostile, had begun to grow after a 
long period of relative corporate stability in Japan. “Risk management” 
was embraced by Japanese corporations battered by record levels of 
corporate insolvency and facing new challenges ranging from dependence 
on information technology to the aggressive use of intellectual property 
rights by U.S. trade competitors. “Compliance” was suddenly in vogue as 
banks and corporations established compliance departments, either to 
supplement or function as in-house legal departments, in order to cope 
with new regulatory legislation or older statutes that were now being 
 
 
 94. See, e.g., ULRIKE SCHAEDE, COOPERATIVE CAPITALISM: SELF-REGULATION, TRADE 
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN JAPAN (2000); MARK TILTON, RESTRAINED TRADE: 
CARTELS IN JAPAN’S BASIC MATERIALS INDUSTRIES (1996). 
 95. A counterpart public example is the successful use of litigation, for instance, in establishing 
bureaucratic liability for Japan’s HIV epidemic. ERIC FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: 
LAW, SOCIETY AND HEALTH POLICY 70–72 (2000).  
 96. See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999).  
 97. Takashi Uchida & Veronica L. Taylor, Japan’s “Era of Contract,” in LAW IN JAPAN: A 
TURNING POINT 454 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). Pilot interviews that I conducted in 1996–1997 with 
ten Japanese corporations suggested that the shape and norms of Japanese contracts were not 
immutable. Instead, they were affected by factors such as the parties’ power differentials, perception of 
risk, new legislation (e.g., the then-new Product Liability Law), the perceived threat of litigation, price 
fluctuations in the market, and interference from professional cohorts such as lawyers and insurers. 
This phenomenon was particularly well illustrated in Willem M. Visser’t Hooft’s study of distribution 
contracts in the luxury cosmetics sector, where contract and competition policy intersect. VISSER’T 
HOOFT, supra note 88, at 81–129. 
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enforced more vigorously.98 Reinforcing this trend, a new line of corporate 
law cases spelled out consequences for listed companies failing to 
implement internal corporate controls.99  
The “formal” re-regulation of Japanese banking had been effected 
through the new independent regulator, the FSA, created in 1998.100 The 
FSA was charged with addressing governance weaknesses in banks after a 
decade of malaise in Japan’s banking sector. Takeo Hoshi and Anil K. 
Kashyap argue, however, that these economic woes were not caused 
principally by the inability to recover bad loans made during the “bubble” 
period, but rather by the fact that the Japanese banking industry has never 
been globally competitive.101 They suggest that the core weaknesses of the 
industry (lack of private capital, misallocation of credit and continuous 
renewal of non-performing loans, a sector that is too large to allow 
adequate returns, and an inability to make profit because of government 
restraints on types of financial products) had been visible since at least the 
1980s.102 When Japan’s economic downturn predictably resulted in bank 
failures and hollowing out of assets, the government’s response was a 
“muddling through” strategy of forbearance, injections of public funds, 
and—through the FSA—selective and intermittent application of global 
banking standards and procedures.103  
The “informal” channel of regulation encompassed extensive 
communication between banks and their regulator, with the government 
signaling its preferred results by, for example, offering public funds to 
banks through subordinated debt and preferred shares of major banks: 
The banks were not forced to recapitalize, but were strongly 
encouraged to apply for the funds. The banks, however, are 
expected to “return” the public funds eventually by accumulating 
enough internal funds to buy-back the shares and debt. Bank of 
Tokyo Mitsubishi and Sumitomo Trust and Banking have already 
 
 
 98. A key example of the latter is the Antimonopoly Law.  
 99. The explicit reference to internal corporate control is first made in Nishimura v. Abekawa, 
1573 SHOJI HOMU 3 (Osaka Dist. Ct. 2000), discussed in Bruce Aronson, Reconsidering the 
Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder 
Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 11 (2003), but is then applied in subsequent directors’ 
liability cases. 
 100. By placing the FSA and banking supervision under the direct control of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, the government directly penalized the Ministry of Finance and also elevated the Prime 
Minister to a new regulatory status, one of the hallmarks of the Koizumi administration. 
 101. See generally Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 23. 
 102. Id. at 1. 
 103. Id. at 24–28. 
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bought-back the government’s holdings of their subordinated 
debt.104 
These measures, however, underscored the limits of regulatory turn-
around in the absence of new sources of capital or dramatic improvement 
in the economy. Thus, foreign investment became important for the sector. 
The three banking groups featured in this case study were all globalized 
banks.  
In the case of Sumitomo Trust Bank, foreign ownership was reported 
as representing thirty percent of its issued shares at the time of the 
dispute.105 
The Sumitomo-UFJ transaction illustrates multiple dimensions of 
global regulatory pressures. At the macro level, legal sociologist Shiro 
Kashimura stresses that “globalization” in twenty-first century Japan is a 
very different phenomenon from the “internationalization” of the 1980s; it 
means a faster, deeper integration of Japan into the global economy in 
ways that are not entirely controllable, with regulatory results that provoke 
intense anxiety.106 At the industry level, Japanese government policy 
action in encouraging “market-based” mergers or in applying capital 
adequacy standards was directly influenced by global industry standards. 
At the institutional level, all three banking groups traded in the United 
States107 and had significant foreign share ownership.108 They shaped the 
transaction and documented it in line with global standards and devised 
their negotiating strategies with an eye on how their techniques would play 
with global observers. Not surprisingly, then, we see statements by 
Sumitomo and UFJ during this period emphasizing (i) shareholder value—
a relatively new corporate norm for Japan at that time—and (ii) the impact 
of the failed transaction on foreign perceptions of the market. For 
example, UFJ said: 
“We have explained to the court that Sumitomo Trust & Banking’s 
request for a provisional injunction has no legal basis and that our 
 
 
 104. Id. at 10. 
 105. Fackler & Sender, supra note 8. 
 106. Shiro Kashimura, Legal Dynamics: A Multi-Disciplinary Inquiry into Law in the Era of 
Globalization, in HORIZONTAL LEGAL ORDER: LAW AND TRANSACTION IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 3, 
4–8 (Shiro Kashimura & Akito Saito eds., 2008). 
 107. Fackler & Sender, supra note 8. 
 108. Id. As Christina Ahmadjian notes in relation to Sumitomo Trust Bank’s sister institution: “In 
2003, Goldman Sachs purchased $1.27 billion of preferred shares, convertible into regular shares in a 
number of years, in Sumitomo Mitsui Bank. These more concentrated stakes by single funds suggested 
that foreign ownership would become increasingly influential over time.” Ahmadjian, supra note 85, 
at 130.  
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group, MTFG, and Japan’s economy and financial markets would 
suffer greatly if an injunction was granted.” The group’s comments 
came in response to a claim from Atsushi Takahashi, Sumitomo’s 
President, that trust in Japanese law and the country’s economy 
would be undermined if UFJ was able to pull out of the sale.109 
These claims seem aimed at foreign investors who were likely to be 
more mobile in the market, rather than at the banks’ domestic institutional 
investors or shareholders from their own industrial groups. Such 
statements are a significant departure from the Haley paradigm—when 
Authority Without Power was published, foreign share ownership by 
market value of all listed companies in Japan was still in single digits: 
about 4.2% in 1990.110 By the time of our case study dispute, foreign 
ownership had climbed steadily so that it was at 21.8% in 2004 and 28.0% 
in 2007.111  
A study by Christina Ahmadjian from the early 2000s identifies foreign 
shareholder influence in Japan in the corporate governance terms of 
“voice” or “exit.”112 Ahmadjian argues that “exit” represented a powerful 
option for foreign investors in the 1990s, who “had an influence over 
Japanese share prices far in excess of their actual stakes.”113 They were far 
more likely to buy and sell than Japanese investors and “propped up share 
prices at a time when banks and other long-term shareholders were selling 
their holdings.”114 For banks in particular, “lowered stock prices also had 
an impact on banks’ shareholdings—and if the share prices went too low, 
they threatened to affect their capital adequacy ratios.”115 
Foreign shareholders also used their “voice” to exercise their voting 
rights against management proposals in 43.7% of companies surveyed in 
2003, compared with 19% in 1999.116 In 2003, however, foreign investors 
had seldom escalated that voice to the point of being protagonists in 
litigation such as derivative suits.117 More often, they exercised informal 
 
 
 109. Barney Jopson, UFJ Hits Back As Sumitomo Seeks Injunction, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at 
18. 
 110. TOKYO STOCK EXCH. GROUP, TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 1998, at 115 (1998), 
available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/data/factbook/fact_book_1998.pdf. 
 111. TOKYO STOCK EXCH. GROUP, TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 2008, at 61, available 
at http://www.tse.or.jp/English/market/data/factbook/fact_book_2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
 112. Ahmadjian, supra note 85. 
 113. Id. at 133.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 134. 
 116. Id. at 135 (citing a 2003 survey by leading legal publisher Shōji Hōmu, but not listing it in the 
bibliography). 
 117. Id. at 138. 
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voice in meetings with corporate CEOs and corporate investor relations 
departments, and through representative bodies such as the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Japan (“ACCJ”).118 If Ahmadjian’s argument 
accurately captures foreign investor postures in 2003, it would suggest that 
Sumitomo’s commitment to litigation, both at the injunctive relief stage 
and in the later damages claim, could be read as an attempted show of 
strength, possibly for the benefit of foreign investors and/or industry 
analysts.  
Thus, in Sumitomo v. UFJ we see the diffusion of regulation among a 
range of players who compete in what Colin Scott has termed “the 
regulatory space.”119 The metaphor is useful because it suggests a 
suspended sphere with multiple planes and influences, rather than older 
regulatory images such as an “iron triangle” of fixed players, a vertical 
channel of state-citizen “command and control,” or a purely horizontal 
axis of private actor interactions. This is also consistent with studies that 
demonstrate the greater prominence of new regulatory players, including 
consumer advocates, non-governmental organizations, and shareholder 
activists.120  
This range of state and private actors engaged in voluntary and induced 
regulatory techniques is consistent with both Christine Parker and John 
Braithwaite’s observation that studies of post-industrial states tend to show 
pluralization of regulation121 and with Haley’s earlier work on the mix of 
formal and informal social ordering in Japan. The Sumitomo v. UFJ case 
study, however, introduces the idea that the Japanese “regulatory space” 
has become porous. Certainly, mobilizing gaiatsu (foreign pressure) has 
been a standard play in Japanese regulatory politics in the postwar period, 
as has been the invocation of the threat of foreign domination, takeover, or 
destruction.122 What seems to have changed is that the foreign 
stakeholders—in our case global regulators and foreign shareholders—are 
now inside the regulatory space and likely to stay there. 
 
 
 118. Id. at 136. 
 119. Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design, 
2001 PUB. L. 329. 
 120. Although the categories existed prior to 1989, the players have benefitted from legislation 
and policy changes that endow them with a new status or the ability to organize more effectively. See, 
e.g., ROBERT PEKKANEN, JAPAN’S DUAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2006). 
 121. Parker & Braithwaite, supra note 5.  
 122. HALEY, supra note 3, at 179.  
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JURIDIFICATION OF JAPAN?  
Sumitomo v. UFJ further seems to signal a departure from the Haley 
paradigm of regulation in Japan in the way the players turn to the courts—
what we might call the juridification of the dispute.123 In line with Haley’s 
writings, many accounts of the Japanese state to date have depicted courts, 
independent regulatory agencies, and legal professions as playing a 
marginal role.124 In those narratives, bureaucrats either dominate 
politicians, or, according to Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth’s 
agency theory, are controlled by them.125 In either case, bureaucrats 
exercise “authority without power,” harnessing informal social norms to 
achieve their desired regulatory objectives, including dispute resolution.126 
Business is steered through administrative guidance and government-
supported self-regulation,127 or through “cooperative regulation,”128 
“cooperative capitalism,”129 or “communitarian capitalism.”130 
Emphasizing the minimal traction of direct legal regulation on 
corporations, Seigo Hirowatari calls this policy setting “corporatism,” or 
law restrained in the service of economic growth.131 The resulting relative 
lack of litigation—including commercial litigation—has become a 
dominant characterization of Japan in the varieties of capitalism 
literature,132 comparative regulatory studies,133 as well as in older literature 
 
 
 123. Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF 
SOCIAL SPHERES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). Juridification is not really a regulatory theory 
per se, but it may be a useful conceptual tool for exploring the ways in which formal law and formal 
dispute resolution processes are being deployed and understood by a range of regulatory players in 
Japan. 
 124. HALEY, supra note 3. 
 125. J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES M. ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN’S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 
(1993). 
 126. HALEY, supra note 3.  
 127. See, e.g., MARK TILTON, RESTRAINED TRADE: CARTELS IN JAPAN’S BASIC MATERIALS 
INDUSTRIES (1996). 
 128. See Veronica L. Taylor, Consumer Contract Governance in a Deregulating Japan, 27 
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 99 (1997).  
 129. SCHAEDE, supra note 94. 
 130. ANCHORDOGUY, supra note 16. 
 131. Seigo Hirowatari, Post-war Japan and the Law: Mapping Discourses of Legalization and 
Modernization, 3 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 155 (2000).  
 132. See, e.g., PETER A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (2001). 
 133. See, e.g., ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); 
ROBERT KAGAN & LEE AXELROD, REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
422 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:399 
 
 
 
 
such as Chalmers Johnson’s account of the Japanese “developmental 
state.”134  
Running as a counterpoint to the “low litigation” narrative is a long 
history of active litigation in Japan when commercial, private, and public 
interest matters are contested publicly as protests against dominant social 
norms or as challenges to government or powerful interests.135 The 
Sumitomo v. UFJ case, however, is not part of that “protest” litigation 
stream—it is instead commercial disputation between two powerful 
financial institutions. In this sense it seems to depart from the minimal 
litigation thesis and, rather, to align with the values espoused in the 2001 
Justice System Reform policy. 
In 2001, the Japanese government suddenly announced that law and 
legal institutions—including litigation—are the “final linchpin” in the 
restructuring of “the shape of our country.”136 On the streets, public 
slogans, campaigns, and banners announced that formal regulation 
(“rules”) will now govern, instead of informal social ordering 
(“manners”).137 This is a top-down reform that nevertheless aims to engage 
and empower citizens in the processes of law and litigation.138 Within the 
commercial sphere, the new policy sought to harness the technologies of 
law to bolster the operation of markets. It presented economic actors with 
a range of enhanced procedural tools for asserting their rights against the 
state and against each other.  
The Justice System Reform agenda is also consistent with a second 
element of juridification, which is the way in which ordinary transactions, 
whether commercial or consumer, now are regulated as self-consciously 
“legal” transactions that require support from professional intermediaries; 
place cost and risk on the parties or the consumer; require a documentary 
output; and channel disputes to a formal legal institution, whether 
institutionalized mediation or civil litigation.139  
 
 
 134. CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS? THE RISE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
(1995). 
 135. UPHAM, supra note 3; FELDMAN, supra note 3.  
 136. JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
COUNCIL—FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (available in Japanese as: SHIHŌSEIDO 
KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI, SHIHŌSEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI IKENSHO: 21 SEIKI NO NIHON WO SASAERU 
SHIHŌSEIDO (HEISEI 13 NEN 6 GATSU 12 NICHI), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihauseido/ 
dai63/63gaiyou.html). 
 137. See, e.g., Chiyoda-ku seikatsu kankyō jōrei [Chiyoda Ward Ordinance on Living 
Environment] (2003), http://kugikaicity.chiyoda.tokyo.jp. 
 138. See Haley & Taylor, supra note 7. 
 139. See Uchida & Taylor, supra note 97. 
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Sumitomo v. UFJ fits only partially within this second dimension of 
juridification. It would make for a neater re-regulatory parable if 
Sumitomo v. UFJ stood unambiguously for routine use of formal law, 
dense documentation, lawyers, and litigation in business. At the time, I 
was tempted to see it as representing “a paradigm shift on the legal 
side. . . . It shows a more legally aware business mindset in commercial 
dealings. The days of unspoken understandings underpinned by personal 
relationships are fading away.”140 
But the real significance of the case seems more ambiguous. Reaction 
to Sumitomo’s actions was divided, both at home and abroad. In some 
quarters, Sumitomo’s litigation was seen as vindication of a domestic 
deregulatory discourse, a symbolic marker of “a more confrontational and 
legalistic society.”141 In other circles, Sumitomo was castigated for seeking 
an injunction, because it opened the door to “court intervention” in what 
was potentially a more lucrative rival deal for UFJ. In this case, the first 
Japanese court treatment of a bank merger, some observers saw “court 
intervention” as arresting a shift from developmental state-style planning 
to market-driven transactions. Some questioned whether halting this trend 
was an appropriate role for a court. Yet other observers saw Sumitomo’s 
actions—bringing a banking industry transaction into the glare of public 
and legal scrutiny—as immoral, a reaction that aligns with the Haley 
paradigm.142  
The contractual aspects of Sumitomo v. UFJ also straddle the divide 
between older, socially embedded social norms and newer, juridical forms 
of contract as a regulatory technique. So, for example, both the district 
court decision and the appellate court-brokered settlement also invoke 
older business and legal norms about contract termination, calibrating 
damages according to factors such as the process followed in termination 
of the basic agreement, party motive and objectives, the degree of bad 
behavior, what legal benefits were protected under the basic agreement, 
etc.143  
The result in this particular case is somewhat inconclusive, which is 
likely to reignite a normative debate from the 1990s144 in which some 
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no torihiki to keiyakuhō: kyōdō kenkyū—keizokuteki torihiki wo kangaeru [Japanese Transactions and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
424 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:399 
 
 
 
 
lawyers urged that “free competition should be permitted,” and asserted 
that large, established businesses have no need of this kind of court 
paternalism, since they both are capable of devising their own 
transactional norms and should be permitted to do so.145 Sumitomo v. UFJ 
seems to suggest a false dichotomy within the debate, since the parties 
draw freely from elements of both “formal” and “informal” legality and 
dispute resolution strategies.  
The Sumitomo-UFJ merger agreement and the litigation that followed 
are widely recognized as one of the high water marks in business 
disputation in Japan in the 2000s.146 Quantitatively, however, one race to 
the courthouse does not constitute a legal system transformation. So the 
task remains to create a better data set of commercial disputes from the 
same period in order to gauge the degree to which Japan’s regulatory 
patterns may have changed and to pinpoint where they replicate or deviate 
from those of other new regulatory states.  
From a theoretical standpoint, adjusting the Japanese regulatory 
paradigm to emphasize law and legal institutions has the appeal of putting 
law and lawyers where we like to be—in the center of things.147 It may 
also offer a new platform for comparative institutional studies between 
Japan and lego-centric states such as the United States. But as Scott 
cautions, both legalization and juridification are “dead-end” concepts.148 
The danger of elevating legal rules, legal institutions, and legal 
professionals as the “new” governance element in Japan is that this may 
lead us into a fairly narrow reading of regulation, dictating that it be 
effected primarily through state law and state institutions—at precisely the 
time when the state seems to be diversifying its regulatory modes, the 
globalized Japanese market has become porous, and market actors have a 
wider range of norms and stakeholders to consider. Ultimately the new, 
post-Haley, regulatory reality underscored by Sumitomo v. UFJ seems to 
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be the expansion of the formal side of Haley’s paradigm, within a re-
regulated Japan that presents a broader menu of choices for dispute 
strategies and sanctions. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
